The United States  War Power  and Limited Government by Black, Forrest Revere
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 2
1927
The United States "War Power" and Limited
Government
Forrest Revere Black
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Black, Forrest Revere (1927) "The United States "War Power" and Limited Government," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 16 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol16/iss2/2
THE UNITED STATES "WAR POWER" AND LIMITED
GOVERNMENT
"Let everything that is in favor of power be closely construed;
everything in favor of the security of the citizen and the protection
of the individual comprehensively, for the simple reason that power is
power, it is able to take care of itself and tends by its nature to in-
crease, while the citizen needs protection."
FRANCIS LIEBER.
In the whole field of constitutional law, we know of no
problem that has been exposed to so little analysis and concern-
ing which there has been such utter confusion of thought, as the
nature and extent of the war power. Much of the literature of
the subject has been forged in the heat of conflict when the
passions of war were rampant. Our Civil War especially brought
forth a voluminous literature and it is obvious that most of the
writers of that period were guided by their emotional reactions
and not by any critical analysis of the problem. Their state-
ments bear all the earmarks of the special pleader and none of
those of the scholar.
As an illustration, consider the work by Mr. Whiting en-
titled "War Powers Under the Constitution" published in 1871.
It is the thesis of this writer that on the outbreak of war, the
Constitution automatically becomes a scrap of paper. Without
any attempt to classify and distinguish the various functions
that have been grouped under the term "the war power," he
proceeds to demonstrate the absurdity of the view that the war
power is or could be limited. He says, "If enemy's property
cannot be taken without 'due process of law,' how can the sol-
dier disarm his foe and seize his weapons? If no man can be
deprived of life without trial by jury, a soldier cannot slay the
enemy in battle. If no person can be arrested, sentenced or shot
without trial by jury in the county or state where his crime is
alleged to have been committed, how can a deserter be shot or
a spy hung or an enemy be taken prisoner? " '1
Here is the argument of the legal advisor to the War De-
partment in Lincoln's administration. It is the argument of
one, who in his own mind is convinced that he has presented an
irresistible case. Previous to his appointment Mr. Whiting was
1P. 52.
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a patent attorney. It was claimed at the time that his inter-
pretation of the war power was a pure invention and it was
aptly designated as "Patent-War-Office-Constitutional-Law." 2
In any discussion of the war power of the President and of Con-
gress this book should receive considerable attention for two
reasons: A£r. Whiting, by virtue of his official position in the
Lincoln administration, played an important role in the deter-
mination of policy during the Civil Was; and secondly, his book
is the first and thus far the only attempt that has been made
to give a complete and exhaustive presentation of the war power
of the Federal Government.3
Mr. Whiting relies on three main arguments in the develop-
ment of his case for an unlimited government in war time. First,
h. says, "It was intended by the framers of the Constitution, or,
what is of more importance, by the people who made and adopted
it, that the powers of Government in dealing with civil rights in
time of peace, should be defined and limited; but the powers to
'provide for the general welfare and common defence' should be
unlimited. "4 This interpretation of the "general welfare and
common defense" clause is in conflict not only with the decisions
of the highest court and of the great authorities in constitutional
law, but if put into practice it would subvert the powers of the
states and destroy the limited character of the national govern-
ment. The Constitution reads, "The Congress shall have power
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare
of the United States. "5
Mr. Justice Story says, "If tohe clause 'to pay the debts and
provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States' is construed to be an independent and substantive
grant of power, it not only renders wholly unimportant and un-
necessary the subsequent enumeration of specific powers; but it
plainly extends far beyond them, and creates a general authority
'Hon. Joel Parker, address at Salem. Mass., Mar. 13, 1863, entitled
"The War Powers of Congress and of the President," p. 10.
3 Prof. Berdahl of the University of Illinois has written a thesis on
the War Power of the Executive branch of the Government.
4 "The War Powers of the President and the Legislative Powers of
Congress in Relation to Rebellion, Treason and Slavery," Chap. 1, Win.
Whiting.
"Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 1.
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in Congress to pass all laws, which they may deem for the com-
mon defence or general welfare. Under such circumstances, the
Constitution would practically create an unlimited National gov-
ernment. The enumerated powers would tend to embarrassment
and confusion; since they would only give rise to doubts as to
the true extent of the general power, or of the enumerated pow-
ers. . . . On the other hand, construing this clause in con-
nection with, and as a part of the preceding clause, giving the
power to lay and collect taxes, it becomes sensible and operative.
It becomes a qualification of that clause and limits the taxing
power to objects for the common defence or general welfare. It
then contains no grant of any powers whatsoever; but is a mere
expression of the ends and purposes to be effected by the preced-
ing power of taxation. "6
In the Constitutional convention, Governor Randolph, an-
swering Patrick Henry as to the meaning of common defense and
general welfare clause, said, "No man who reads it can say it is
general. You must violate every rule of construction and com-
mon sense if you sever it from the power of raising money and
annex it to anything else, in order to ihake it that formidable
power which it is presented to be.' "1
If the Constitution can be so construed as to authorize any
measure which Congress or the President under the stress of a
war hysteria deem expedient to adopt, then there is no longer
any place in our constitutional theory for the conception of
usurpation. We have then gone one step beyond the British
Constitution, which, while it "admits Parliament to be omnip-
otent, and asserts that the King can do no wrong, maintains
that ministers may sometimes usurp power, and holds them ac-
countable for the usurpation.' '
In the second place, Mr. Whiting places much weight on
the elastic clause. It reads "Congress shall have the power to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers." 9 He says, "The powers
conveyed in this 18th clause of Art. 1, sec. 8, are of vast impor-
62 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, Sections 905, 906, 908.
3 Elliot's Debates 599.
8 Joel Parker: "The War Powers of Congress and of the President,"
p. 14, 1863.
0 Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 18.
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tance and extent. It may be said that they are in one sense, un-
limited and discretionary. They are more than imperial."'1 In
reply to this contention, two points should be considered: first,
the elastic clause does not grant any new or additional power
It is only a formal recognition of the legislative duty to provide
the necessary laws for carrying into effect the "foregoing pow-
ers." What the foregoing powers are will never be discovered
from this clause but only from the foregoing clauses." In the
second place, the Constitution being a written document, it must
be construed as a whole and any particular grant, however un-
qualified the language, must be construed so as to be consistent
with the other provisions.
Finally, Mr. Whiting's whole work seems to be permeated
with the idea that the Federal government can exercise every
power which is not expressly prohibited to it by the Constitu-
tion. One illustration of this is where he says, "If the framers
of the Constitution intended to take from Congress the power
of passing laws relative to slaves in the states or elsewhere, they
would have drafted a clause to the effect. '"12 This interpreta-
tion is in direct conflict with the Tenth amendment which pro-
vides, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to
the states respectively or to the people." Mr. Joel Parker com-
menting on this bizarre interpretation of the solicitor to the Lin-
coln War Department says, "The Constitution contains no clause
or sentence prohibiting Congress from reenacting the edicts of
Herod, that all the young children should be slain, under an
assumption, within such discretionary power of Congress, that
if they were permitted to live, they might rebel, and endanger
the safety of the government. Nor does the Constitution contain
any clause or sentence, prohibiting Congress from directing that
all the Catholics shall be murdered on a particular day; and
what shall hinder that body, in the exercise of powers 'unin-
ited' and 'more than imperial' from proceeding to such consti-
tutional legislation, whenever in their judgment, the public wel-
fare requires it ? Why may we not conclude that 'If the framers
of the Constitution intended to take from Congress the power of
" Ibid., Chap. 1.
Kneedler v. Lane, 46 Pa. St. 238.
Ibid., Chap. 1.
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passing' such laws 'they would have drafted a clause to that
effect.' "13
To cap the climax, Mr. Whiting resorts to this unconvinc-
ing a priori reasoning: "The rights of war and the rights of
peace cannot co-exist. One must yield to the other, hence the
Constitution is framed with full recognition of that fact.''14
We submit that no light can be thrown on our problem by such
an uncritical approach. Before we can intelligently discuss the
question whether there are constitutional limitations on the war
power, we must know first, what powers are included under this
term; and second, what is the relation of the Constitution to each
of them. These questions cannot be answered by any rhetorical
flourish, however clever; this problem cannot be solved by any
patriotic appeal, however powerful. It is imperative that a crit-
ical analysis should precede the statement of conclusions.
At the outset it should be noted that the "war power" of
the Constitution is to be found in the following provisions:
Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 11, "The Congress shall have power to
declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make
rules concerning captures on land and water;
Clause 12, "To raise and support armies, but no appropria-
tion of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two
years;"
Clause 13, '!To provide and maintain a navy;"
Clause 14, "To make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces;"
Clause 15, "To provide for calling forth the militia to exe-
cute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel in-
vasions; "
Clause 16, "To provide for organizing, arming and discip-
lining the militia, and for the governing such part of them as
may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving
to the states re:'pectivc]y the appointment of the officers, and the
authority of training the militia according to the discipline pre-
scribed by Congress:"
Clause IS, "To make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and
1' Joel Parker: The War Powers of Congress and of the President,
1863, p. 19.1 War Powers Under the Constitution, 1871, p. 51.
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all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government
of the United States, or in any department or officer theieof;"
Art. 2, See. 2, clause 1, "The President shall be Commander-
in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the
militia of the several states when called into the actual service
of the United States."
We cannot proceed far in our analysis without making the
distinction between the internal and the external aspects of the
war power. The internal aspect covers that phase of the war
power as it affifects our own citizens and as it tends to abrogate
the safeguards contained in the Bill of Rights. The external
aspect covers the phase of the war power as exercised against
public enemies, including the rules and practices of warfare, the
treatment of prisoners and enemy non-combatants and the gen-
eral status of neutrals. We are concerned in this work solely
with the internal aspect of the war power. This distinction is
well founded and has been followed by the Supreme Court of
the United States. It is our contention that the internal war
power is subject to constitutional limitations. It is true, that
as against public enemies, the external war power is unlimited,
except as rdgulated by the law of nations.' 0- 16 Our highest court
has gone so far as to say that the law of nations may be modified
as against public enemies by peculiar conditions. 17 In Dooley
v. United States's the Supreme Court held that "the right of
one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy
while in its military possession is one of the incidents of war,
and flows directly from the right to conquer. 'We, therefore, do
not look to the Conststution or political institutions of the con-
queror for authority to establish a government for the territory
of the enemy in his possession ,during its military occupation
nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are
regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are de-
rived directly from the laws of war... .
In order that there may be no misunderstanding as to our
purpose and no confusion as to the distinction between the in-
100 U. S. 158, New Orleans v. X. 7. Mail S. H. do.
1 20 Wall. 387.
"TMiller v. U. S., 11 Wall. 268; See Chas. P. Williams, "The Silence
of the Laws."
2 St. Louis Law Review, Vol. 3; 182 U. S. 222, 230-231.
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ternat and the external aspects of the war power, a further lim-
itation should now be recognized. We intend to deal only with
the problem of foreign war, that is to say, the sort of war that',
usually begins with a declaration and ends with a treaty. We
concede that in a great civil war, in a country such as ours, it
would be impossible, in all cases, to maintain the distinction be-
tween the internal and external aspects of the war power.
A study of our Civil War will show that many of the war
measures of the Lincoln administration and the reconstruction
program which followed, were utterly inconsistent with the con-
stitutiofial theory on which the Union based its case at the
outset. 19 Lincoln in his first inaugural said, "No state upon
its mere motion can lawfully get *ut of the Union; that resolves
or ordinances to that effect are legally void and that acts of
violence within any state or states against the authority of the
United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to
circumstances." Chief Justice Chase, speaking for the Supreme
Court in the case of Texas v. White,2 0 expressed the same view.
The legislative branch, acting on the same theory, did not declare
war against the South and no treaty of peace was signed with
the Confederacy at the close of the war.
Only four days after Lincoln's first call for troops, he de-
clared a blockade of southern ports, which from the standpoints
of both Constitutional and international law was the exercise of
a war power. . Almost from the start the Federal Government
treated the Confederates for some purposes as public enemies
and at the same time for other purposes as citizens. The Su-
preme Court in re Mrs. Alexander's Cotton21 affirmed the opin-
ion of the lower court in which Judge Sprague had held that
"The (the Confederates) are at the same time belligerents and
traitors and.subject to the liabilities of both." Certain property
of the Confederates was considered contraband and at the same
time certain owners" of that property were being tried for treason
and would have been executed if Jefferson Davis' threat of re-
taliation had not been effective. The whole Reconstruction pro-
gram in its attempts to penalize the Confederate states was ob-
viously inconsistent with the original theory of the North as ex-
See W. W. Willoughby, "The American Constitutional System."
74 U. S. 726.
=2 Wall. 404.
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pressed by the executive, the legislative and judicial depart-
ments.
In introducing this brief sketch relating to the Civil War
period it is not our intention to condone all of the acts of the
Lincoln administration or to contend that in the case of a civil
war that all constitutional guarantees must of necessity be abro-
gated. On the contrary it is our belief, that there were many
instances of a wanton and unnecessary use of power on the part
of the Federal government during the unfortunate fratricidal
strife. But with that we are not here concerned.
We are deliberately limiting the scope of our inquiry in
order that the discussion may be logically consistent and at the
same time of some practical significance. Those who are cogni-
zant of the facts of contemporary world polities and who appre-
ciate the relationship existing today between diplomacy and in-
ternational finance, must realize that the real danger that
America must face is another trans-oceanic crusade. Inasmuch
as another great civil war in this country is unthinkable, in mak-
ing the above exception and concession, we are not thereby weak-
ening our case in fact.
Let us consider from the standpoint of constitutional theory
the status of the Constitution of the United States in war time.
We start with the proposition that the basic idea of the Ameri-
can plan of government is an irreconcilable opposition to un-
limited power. We now come to the second link in our argu-
ment, that the Constitution binds in war as well as in peace. On
this point there is no finer statement in legal literature than that
of Justice Davis of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the famous case of ex parte M,1tigam.22  The context and the
nature of the facts show that he is discussing the interal aspect
of the war power. We quote at length" "The Constitution of
the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No
doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever in-
vented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the
4 Wall. 2.
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theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the govern-
ment, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it
which are necessary to preserve its existence, as has been happily
proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just
authority.
"This nation as experience has proved cannot always re-
main at peace, and has no right-to expect that it will always have
wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of
the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred
of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied
by Washington and Lincoln. . . . Our fathers knew-the
history of the world told them-the nation they were founding,
be its existence short or long, Nwould be involved in war; how
often or how long continued human foresight could not tell; and
that unlimited power wherever lodged at such a time was es-
pecially hazardous to free men. For this and other equally
weighty reasons, they secured the inheritance they had fought
to maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution, the safe-
guards which time had proved were essential to its preserva-
tion. " 1
The internal war power of the United States government
is limited. This follows logically from the principle that our
Constitution sets up a limited government and that certain in-
terests are thereby secured to the individual even against the
will of the majority. Futhermore in the Constitution of the
United States there is no express recognition of the doctrine of
a suspension of constitutional guarantees in times of emergency
except in the case of the wiit of habeas corpus and then only in
times of rebellion or invasion. Art. 1, See. 9, Clause 2, reads:
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it." It should be noted first, that as far as
the United States territory is concerned., the words "rebellion"
or "invasion" are virtually synonymous with the word "war,"
and second, that this express exception in the case of habeas
corpus negatives the idea of a general implied power of suspen-
sion of constitutional guarantees in war time. Those who be-
lieve that the Constfution of the United States should be sus-
pended as soon as we enter a war, will have an insuperable diffi-
culty in explaining why the framers of the Constitution ex-
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pressly provided for this single exception. The Supreme Court
of the United States in referring to this point has said, "Not
one of these safeguards can the President or Congress or the
Judiciary disturb, except the one concerning the writ of habeas
corpus."123  And it is now well settled that -Congress alone has
the power to suspend this writ in case of invasion or rebel-
lion.24 Speaking of the limitations in the habeas corpus clause,
Taney, C. J., says in Merryman's case, "The introduction of
these words is a standing admonition to the Legislative body of
the danger of suspending it (the writ) and of the extreme cau-
tion they should exercise before they give the government of the
United States such power over the liberty of a citizen."
There is one other provision of the Constitution that should.
be considered in this connection, altho the word "suspended" is;
not there used. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No
person shhll be held to answer for a capital or otherwise in-
famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger."
This exception also negatives the idea of a general implied
power of suspension in war time and becomes mere surplusage
if the Constitution is considered only as a peace document. Pro-
fessor Wambaugh of the Harvard Law School has also given aid
and comfort to the advocates of unlimited power in war time.
He says, "Regarding all the powers given to the national gov-
ernment it is to be said that the Constitution, like any other
document, prima facie is to be understood as having in mind
normal life and not abnormal life; for normal life, is, so to speak,
its atmosphere and content. . . . All general language must
be taken prira facie as referring to normal life, and the normal
life is peace, not war.''25 There is a modicum of truth in this
" War Emergency Legislation, pp. 668-673.
as an abstract proposition, but it cannot legitimately be pushed
to such an extreme as to justify the complete abrogation of the
Constitution in war time. How much evidence would the author
of this statement require to rebut this prima facie presumption?
The history of the debates in the Constitutional Convention do
not support the proposition that the Constitution was intended
'Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
2 Ex Parte Merryman, Campbell's Reports 246.
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exclusively as a peace time document. The two express excep-
tions referred .to above relating to habeas corpus and indictment
,by grand jury negative the idea of a general implied power of
,auspension of constitutional guarantees. Finally, before this in-
,terpretation can have any validity and before the doctrine of
,nnlimited power can be made a part of the American constitu-
tional system, it is necessary to answer the great constitutional
,arguments in behalf of limited government that have been ex-
pounded by the Supreme Court of the United States in a long
line of cases, and perhaps in their most perfect form in ex Parte
Milligan.26 When these propositions are squarely met, the
prima facie presumption vanishes.
Further, it has been claimed by some statesmen and politi-
cians that the war power is unlimited and they have attempted
to defend their position by resorting to the following extra-con-
stitutional theories: 1. Self-preservation. 2. Necessity knows
no law. 3. Salus populi suprema lex est. 4. Retaliation. 5.
A supreme species of police power. 6. Inherent sovereignty.
It is to be noted that all Qf these extra-constitutional bases are
utterly inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and with the
fundamental idea underlying our constitutional system, i. e., that
is a limited government. To adopt any of these theories is to
-ignore the Constitution and to make the majority faction in the
government omnipotent, in time 6f war.
A typical illustration of this doctrine is found in a speech
,by Senator Sumner in the United States Senate, June 27, 1862.
:He said, "Pray, sir, where in the Constitution is any limitation
of the war powers? Let the Senators who would limit them
mention a single section, line, or phrase which even hints at any
limitation. . . . The war powers are derived from the Con-
stitution but, when once set in motion, are without any restraint
from the Constitution; so that what is done in pursuance of
them is at the same time under the -Constitution and outside the
Constitution. It is under the Constitution in the latitude with
which it is conducted; but whether under the Constitution or
outside the Constitution, all that is done in pursuance of the war
power is Constitutional. " 27 Sumner again said, "But in be-
stowing upon the government war powers without limitation, the
20 4 Wall. 2.
2 Works of Ohas. Sumner, VII, pp. 131-2.
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makers of the Constitution embodied in the Constitution all the
rights of war as completely as if those rights had been severally
set down and enumerated; and among the first of these is the
right to disregard. the rights of peace."'28
That this is sophistry and that it is utterly incompatible
with our written Constitution is established by the following con-
siderations. In the first place the history of the ratification of
the Constitution and the incorporation of the bill of rights and
especially the ninth and tenth amendments, give the lie to the
theory of unlimited power. In the second place it is only fair
to assume that the framers of the Constitution anticipated the
time when this nation would be involved in war and having set
up a limited government they refused to place in the funda-
mental law any recognition of the doctrine of a suspension of
constitutional guarantees except in the case of the writ of habeas
corpus, and this single express exception negatives the idea of a
general implied power of suspension. Thirdly, Senator Sumner
fails to distinguish between the internal and the external as-
pects of the war power. And finally, without revealing any
basis, historical or legal, for his theory of constitutional construc-
tion, he wants us to accept on the authority of his ipse dixit the
proposition that "Whether under the Constitution or outside
the Constitution, all that is done in pursuance of the war powers
is constitutional." 29
Another statement of a similar nature in favor of an un-
limited war power was made by John Quincy Adams in a debate
in the United States Senate in 1836. He said, "Sir, in the au-
thority given to Congress by the Constitution to declare war, all
the powers incidental to war are, by necessary implication, con-
ferred upon the government of the United States. Now the
powers incidental to war are derived, not from any internal
municipal source, but from the laws and usages of nations. There
are then, Mr. Chairman, in the authority of Congress and the
Executive, two classes of power, altogether different in nature
and often incompatible with each other-the war power and the
peace power. The peace power is limited by regulations and
restricted by provisions prescribed within the Constitution itself.
The war power is limited only by the laws and usages of nations.
28 Ibid., pp. 136-7.
' Ibid., pp. 126-7.
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This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional, but it
breaks down every barrier, so anxiously erected for the protec-
tion of liberty, of property and of life."
This statement of John Quincy Adams is just as vulnerable
as that of Senator Sumner. Mr. Adams claims that an un-
limited war power may be implied from the express war pro-
visions in the Constitution. But there is no justification for an
implied power which directly conflicts with an express consti-
tutional guarantee; that is to say, with the Bill of Rights. He
not only fails to distinguish between the internal and the ex-
ternal aspects of the war power, but he also refuses to be gov-
erned by the constitutional limitations on the war power. He
ignores the basic idea of a limited national government as ex-
pressed in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments and sets up an ex-
ternal standard for implied war powers, namely, the practices
of other nations. No more effective theory could be devised to
abrogate the -Constitution in war time so far as the rights of
American citizens are concerned. In the last analysis this doc-
trine does not even rest on the law of nations. It may ultimately
lead to the recognition and acceptance of the pernicious idea of
retaliation and thus the combatant with the lowest standard sets
the pace.
Senator Platt, at the time of the Spanish American war,
enunciated a theory of constitutional construction which was
properly labelled the theory of inherent sovereignty. The par-
ticular occasion for this statement was the acquisition of terri-
tory at the end of the war. Senator Platt said, "I propose to
maintain that the United States is a nation; that as a nation it
possesses every sovereign power not reserved in its Constitution
to the states or to the people; that the right to acquire territory
was not reserved and is therefore an inherent sovereign right." 30
This doctrine as extended to apply to the general war power has
been stated as follows: Before the Constitution was adopted,
the American people had asserted their right to wage war as a
unit. Hence it is argued that the national government gets its
power to wage.war-not from the Constitution-but that the
power is inherent in sovereignty. It is claimed that the consti-
20 Cong. Rec., Dec. 19, 1898, Vol. XXXII, p. 287.
8 See Corwin: The Constitution and What It Means Today, p. 30.
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tutional provisions simply regulate in some particulars the
exercise of the power.
The Supreme Court of the United States in 1906 emphat-
ically repudiated this doctrine in the case of Kansas v. Colo-
rado.3 2 The Court said, "But the proposition that there are leg-
islative powers affecting the nation as a whole which belongs to,
altho not expressed in the grant of powers, in direct conflict with
the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers.
That this is such a government clearly appears from the constitu-
tion independently of the amendments; for otherwise there
would be an instrument granting certain specified things made
operative to grant other and distinct things. This natural con-
struction of the constitution is made absolutely certain by the
Tenth Amendment. This amendment, whbch, was seemingly
adopted with prescience of just such contention as the present,
discloses the widespread fear that the national government might,
under the pressure of supposed general welfare, attempt to exer-
eise powers which had not been granted. With equal determina-
tion, the framers intended that no such assumption should ever
find justification in the organic act, and that if in the future
further powers seemed necessary, they should be granted by the
people in the manner they had provided for amending the act."
Professor W. W. Willoughby says,3 3 "There can be no question
as to the constitutional unsoundness as well as the revolutionary
charter of the (inherent sovereignty) theory thus advanced. To
accept it would be at once to overturn a long line of decisions that
have held the United States government to be one of limited
powers.' ' 34 This theory is undesirable, that is, sets up an extra
constitutional standard and in so doing makes our fundamental
law superfluous.
"206 U. S. 46, 89, 90.
"Prof. Willoughby after criticising the inherent sovereignty theory
has pointed out that the Supreme Court has at times used language
which, especially whenitaken out of its context, would seem to implay
the correctness of the inherent sovereignty theory. Such cases are
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457; U. H. v. Jones, 109 II. S. 513; Church
v. U. S., 136 U. S. 1; Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698. Most of
these decisions are really based on the theory of "resulting powers."
(Student's edition, Footnote, p. 55.)
Const. Law, Vol. 1, p. 66.
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRnAL.
On April 20, 1906, Representative Bourke Cockran, in a
speech in the House of Representatives, formulated the empiric
theory of constitutional construction. He said, "Whereever a
wrong is found to exist with which the nation can deal more
effectively than a state, it is the business of Congress to suggest
a remedy. We can tell whether it is constitutional or unconsti-
tutional when the court pronounces upon it and not before. Even
if the court declares it uncontstitutional its decision will not
reduce us to helplessness. When it drives us from establishing
a remedy by legislation it will by that very act direct us to pro-
pose a remedy by constitutional amendments." This theory is
especially objectionable in war time. In the first place it virtually
disregards the distribution of power between the states and the
central government as defined in the fundamental law and sets
up the effectiveness of the legislation as an extra constitutional
basis for the existence of the power. Obviously, the uniformity
of national law as contrasted with the diversity of state regu-
lation would be a compelling argument for the exercise of a
sweeping national power if this theory were adopted in war time.
It would mean that the states would be reduced to mere adminis-
trative areas. Secondly, the adoption of this theory would cause
members of Congress to violate their oaths to support the Con-
stitution of the United States and would cause them to "pass
the buck" to the Supreme Court, and as I shall show later that
court, in the case of war time legislation would be in such a pecu-
liar position and under such tremendous pressure that it would
uphold the act. In this manner Congress, for the period of the
war, would virtually set itself above the Constitution, encroach-
ing alike on the states and on minorities.
Another theory of constitutional construction is known as
the James Wilson-Roosevelt theory. Professor Willoughby states
the theory as it applies to congressional powers as follows: "That
when a subject has been neither expressly excluded from the
regulating power of the Federal government, nor expressly
placed within the exclusive control of the states, it may be reg-
ulated by Congress if it be, or become, a matter the regulation
of which is of general importance to the whole nation, and at the
same time a matter over which the states are, in practical fact,
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unable to exercise the necessary controlling power.' '3 The
Supreme Court of the United States has repudiated this theory
in the case of Kansas v. Colorado" as being contrary to the
Tenth Amendment.
As far as the President's office is concerned, the James
WU/ison-Roosevelt theory leads to a belief in inherent executive
power. Roosevelt said, "I declined to adopt the view that what
was imperatively necessary for the nation could-not b done by
the President unless he could find some specific authorization to
do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty
to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless
such action was forbidden by the -Constitution or by the laws."
3 7
It has been claimed that Article II of the Constitution, dealing
with the executive, warrants this view inasmuch as the language
used is much more general than that used in Article I dealing
with the legislative department or in Article III dealing with
the judiciary. Article II reads, "The executive power shall be
vested in a President, etc." .Article I begins as follows: "All
legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress,"
and Article III expressly states that the judicial power "shall
extend to" certain enumerated cases. But the Supreme Court
has also emphatically repudiated the Roosevelt theory of ex-
ecutive power. The court said, "We have no officers in this
government from the President down to the most subordinate
agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed
duties and limited authority. "38
Ex-President Taft states the correct view of executive
power. He says, "The President can exercise no power which
cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of
power or justly implied and included within such express grant
as proper and necessary to its exercise. Such specific grant must
be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress
passed in pursuance thereof. Thcre is no undefi,-ed residicum
of power which he can exercise because it seems to him ,o be in
the public interest. The grants of executive powcr are neces-
sarily in general terms in order not to embarass the executive
Willoughby, "Constitutional Law" 1, p. 47.
206 U. S. 46, 89-90.
Roosevelt's Autobiography, pp. 388-9.
The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 676.
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within the field of action plainly marked for him, but his juris-
liction must be justified and vindicated by affirmative constitu-
tional or statutory provisions or it does not exist." 39
Roosevelt while President pleaded for the expansion of fed-
eral power "thru executive action . . . . and thru judicial
interpretation and construction of law." Referring to the Con-
stitution of Cuba, an instrument which our government had
helped to frame, on September 28, 1906, he telegraphed Sec-
retary Taft concerning an adjustment of Cuban affairs as fol-
lows: "I do not care in the least for the fact that such an agree-
ment is unconstitutional. '"4 0 As part of the same program he
urged that "states' rights should be preserved when they mean
the people's rights, but not when they mean the people's
wrongs.' ' 1  In this connection it is well to remember the words
of Edward Livingston, "The gloss of zeal for the public service
is always spread over acts of oppression, and the people are
sometimes made to consider that a brilliant exertion of energy
in their favor which, when viewed in its true light, would be
found a fatal blow to their rights. In no government is this
effect so easily produced as in a free republic; party spirit, in-
separable from its existence, aids the illusion, and a popular
leader is allowed in many instances impunity, and sometimes re-
warded with applause for acts which would make a tyrant trem-
ble on his throne." 42
The so-called James Wilson-Roosevelt theory of constitu-
tional construction is in reality a cross between the inherent
sovereignty theory and the empiric theory with a special em-
phasis on the evolutionary point of view. As such, it is subject
to the same general objection; namely, that it violates the fun-
damental feature of our constitutional system as expressed in
the Tenth Amendment and attempts to set up an extra consti-
tutional standard for governmental action.
It is interesting to note that in no case has the Supreme
Court of the United States based its decision squarely on any
of these extra constitutional theories of the politician and states-
man. Most of its members have thruout its history been avowed
-"Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, pp. 139-40.
40 Quoted in Pierce, Federhl Usurpation, p. 154.
41Pierce, Federal Usurpation, Preface IX-XI.
"Quoted in Bryce, American Commonwealth, Vol. 1, p. 63, footnote.
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advocates of one or two theories of constitutional construction.
The one is often referred to as the Jeffersonian theory of strict
construction; the other as the Marshall theory of implied powers.
The Tenth Amendment is the keystone in the Jeffersonian theory
and the words "necessary and. proper" in the elastic clause are
construed to mean absolutely necessary or indispensable. The
best statement of this doctrine of strict construction was made
by Jefferson as a protest against the first United States bank.
Jefferson said, "I consider the foundation of the Constitution
as laid on this ground: that all powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states or to the people." To take a
single step beyond the boundaries thus specifically drawn around
the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field
of power, no longer susceptible of definition . . . . It has
been urged that a bank will give great facility or convenience
in the collection of taxes. Suppose this were true; yet the Con-
stitution allows only the means that are 'necessary,' not those
which are merely 'convenient,' for effecting the enumerated
powers. If such a latitude of construction be allowed to this
phrase as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go to every-
one, for there is not one which ingenuity may not torture into
a convenience in some instance or other, to some one of so long
a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all of the del-
egated powers, and reduce the whole to one power, as before ob-
served. Therefore it was that the Constitution restrained them
to necessary means; that is to say, to those means without which
the grant of power would be nugatory." When Jefferson
became President he abandoned to a great extent his theory of
strict construction and most of his appointees to the Supreme
bench were more or less swayed by John Marshall, who was ap-
pointed by John Adams as chief justice and held this important
post for thirty-four years in the formative period of American
constitutional law. 4 3
MAr. Justice Daniel of Va., for a period of nineteen years on the
Supreme Bench, consistently dissented from every judgment of the
court which was based upon the recognition of any implied power. He
stated his position as follows: "The constitution itself is nothing more
than an enumeration of general abstract rules, promulgated by the
several states for the guidance or control of their creature or agent, the
federal government, which for their exclusive benefit they were about
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In a number of famous cases 4 4 Marshall gave expression in
its most perfect form to the doctrine of implied powers. As the
first step in the Marshall doctrine, it was pointed out that the
Tenth Amendment upon which Jefferson relied for his theory
of strict construction "omits the word, 'expressly,' and declares
only that the powers 'not delegated to the United States nor pro-
hibited to the states are reserved to the states or to the people,'
thus leaving the question whether the particular power which
may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one
government or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair con-
struction of the whole instrument." As the second step, Mar-
shall insisted that the words "necessary and proper" in the
elastic clause be construed to mean appropriate or convenient.
In United States v. Fisher et al.4 5 he said, "In construing this
clause it would be incorrect, and produce endless difficulties, if
the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized
which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a speci-
fied power. Where various systems might be adopted for that
purpose, it might be said with respect to each, that it was not
necessary because the end might be obtained by other means.
Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be em-
powered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the
exercise of the power granted by the Constitution." As a third
step in his theory of implied powers, Marshall insisted that it
was not necessary to trace back every implied power of the
Federal government to some single grant of authority, but that
it might result from the aggregate authority granted to the Fed-
eral government, by the Constitution. In Cohens v. Virgini-a46
he said, "It is to be observed that it is not indispensable to the
existence of every power clainfed for the Federal government
that it can be found specified in the words of the Constitution,
or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified
powers. Its existence may be deduced fairly from more than
to call into being. Apart from these abstract rules, the federal govern-
ment can have no functions and no existence." Opinion of Justice
Daniel in Marshall v. B. d 0. Ry. Co. 16 How. 346.
"There were two decisions in constitutional law prior to Iarshall's
coming to the bench. There were fifty-one decisions in constitutional
law during his chief justiceship. Bryce, Am. Com., Vol. 1, p. 386n.
412 Cr. 358, 396.
4 16 Wheat. 2G4.
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one of the substantial powers expressly defined, or from them
all combined. It is allowable to group together any number of
them and to infer from them all that the power claimed has been
conferred." Judge Story coined the term "resulting powers"
to describe this sort of case.
Altho the Marshall theory is sometimes referred to as the
theory of loose construction, Marshall realized full well that
there must be a limit to the doctrine of implied powers beyond
which no court could legitimately go in construing our written
constitution. That limitation was best exprest in the now fa-
mouW sentence from the decision of McCullough v. Maryland,47
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Con-
stitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly-adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but which
consist with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, are
constitutional." In another famous case Marshall said, "The
powers of the legislature (referring to Congress) are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten,
the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited
and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be
restrained. The distinction between a government with limited
and unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine
the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited
and acts followed are of equal obligation.''14
The advocates of the inherent sovereignty, the James
Wilson-Roosevelt and the empiric theories and all of the other
exponents of unlimited power in war time claim that they are
also loose constructionists, but in no true sense can they be con-
sidered followers of John Marshall and of his doctrine of implied
powers. The Marshall doctrine looks to the Constitution of the
United States as the source of all governmental authority, and is
consistent with the letter and the spirit of the fundamental law.
All of these and other doctrines set up some extra constitutional
standard as a justification for the exercise of governmental
power and in war time would always ighi6re and often nullify
the fundamental law.
474 Wheat. 316, 421.
'Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137.
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There is no room in American constitutional law for the
doctrine "Inter arma silent leges." Chief Justice Waite ex-
pressed the sound doctrine when he said, "The government of
the United States is one of delegated powers alone. Its au-
thority is defined and limited by the Constitution. All powers
not granted to it by that instrument are reserved to the states
or to the people. No rights can be acquired under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States except such as the government
of the United States has the authority to grant or secure. All
that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the pro-
tection of the states.''"4 9 Justice Brandeis has said, "The war
power of the United States, like its other powers and like the
police power of the states, is subject to applicable constitutional
limitations. "50
We have now discussed two general methods of approach
resorted to by the advocates of unlimited war power; first, the
employment of various extra constitutional theories of construe-
tion; and second, the acceptance of the doctrine of a general sus-
pension of constitutional guarantees in times of emergency. We
have shown that both methods have been emphatically re-
pudiated by the Supreme Court of the United States and that
they are in their very nature inconsistent with the basic princi-
ple of the American plan of government.
There is a variation of the second method of approach ac-
cepted by a large class who thoroughly believe in the abrogation
of individual guarantees and the establishment of an omnipotent
government during the period of a war. But the members of
this group would be highly indignant if anyone should advance
the harsh sounding doctrine that the Constitution is suspended
in war time. They reach the same result, however, by a more cir-
cuitous process. It is their contention that the application of
the constitutional guarantees is so different in war than in peace
that the American Congress in war time is virtually subject to
no limitation except its own discretion, which, as a matter of fact,
is no limitation at all. In their zeal to give the government un-
limited power they have twisted and distorted the doctrine of
implied powers as conceived by the master mind of John Mar-
U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. Rep. 542, 551.
Ilamil' om v. Kentucky Distiflerics Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156.
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shall. They have accepted the doctrine that the end justifies
the means and have often disregarded every sound canon of con-
stitutional construction, submitting a Biblical for a juristic in-
terpretation of the fundamental law. It is an unfortunate fact
that on several occasions, the Supreme Court of the United
States has been confronted by such tremendous pressure, that
it has virtually been forced to accept this view.
Before considering the nature and extent of the president's
power as commander-in-chief in war time, we must note in pass-
hig an interesting theory of constitutional construction which
logically cannot be classified under any of the foregoing extra
constitutional theories of interpretation. In 1862, Mr. Fisher
published a book entitled "The Trial of the Constitution" in
which he attempted to develop the thesis that "Congress is om-
nipotent, in the sense that in the English system, Parliament is
omnipotent." 51 His argument might be paraphrased as fol-
lows: A law that cannot be enforced is a nullity, and so is power
that cannot be exerted. The reserved power of the people cannot
be exercised, and therefore does not exist.52 Power which people
cannot use they do not possess, whether the Constitution re-
serves it'to them or not. 53 If the people cannot make laws nor
execute them, nor apply them judicially nor alter the Con-
stitution-and therefore all of these things must be done by the
government-it is not easy to see wherein their reserved power
consists. 4 Therefore he concludes that a government limited
by internal power is an impossibility.55
This argument of Mr. Fisher is based on the assumption
that all of the officials of all departments of the government will
flagrantly violate their oaths of office and brazenly ignore all of
the checks and limitations on governmental power. If such a
situation should come to pass, it is indeed true that the only
remedy of the citizen would be thru the exercise of the ballot,
and if the officials should refuse to yield office at the expiration
of their respective terms, the only remaining recourse of the
citizen would be revolution. But this is far from saying that
5 Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 41.
'Ibid., p. 48.
Ibid., p. 49.0Ibid., p. 70.
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"the Congress of the United States is omnipotent in the same
sense that in the English system Parliament is omnipotent."
Mr. Fisher continues in the defense of his position by as-
suming an impossible case. He says, "Assume that Congress
should declare that the president should hold for life, that a
deliberate and matured public opinion demanded the alteration,
altho the experiment of making it according to the Fifth Article
(the amending process) was deemed too hazardous because it
would produce the very dangers which the change itself was in-
tended to avoid. Assume that the people would acquiesce and
that after ten years of peaceful and prosperous establishment a
'case' should arise before the Supreme Court of the United
States.'' 56 Obviously, if'we accept all of the conditions of the
impossible assumption and if the people continue to acquiesce,
we will be-forced to agree with Mr. Fisher that the answer to
the riddle is, "Nothing will happen." But his purpose in in-
troducing this discussion is to show that the government itself
has within its discretion the right to determine whether an
amendment to the Constitution shall be made by the government
or whether it shall be made in the manner provided in the Con-
stitution of the United States. He asks, "Does the Constitution
contain no clauses, from which it may be inferred, that altho
the Fifth Article (the amending process) was intended to be
used, if possible, for important and organic amendments, yet
that others of a less serious character may be made by the gov-
ernment itself, as experience shows them to be needed? ' 67 We
submit that a careful perusal of Mr. Fisher's book will not
reveal one scintilla of evidence to establish the proposition that
our government has the constitutional discretionary power to
determine when it shall amend the Constitution by an ordinary
legislative act and when the provision, of the amending process
shall be followed.
There remains to be considered the nature and extent of the
president's power as commander-in-chief. Art. 2, See. 2, clause
1, provides that-"The president shall be commander-in-chief of
the army and the navy of the United States, and of the militia
of the several states when called into the actual service of the
N pp. 80-81.p. 91.
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United States." Concerning this matter, there has been much
confusion of thought. There are those who believe that on the
outbreak of war this clause confers upon the president un-
limited power. In the late World War a patriotic cult de-
veloped in America with representatives in every community
which preached the doctrine that "the president can do no
wrong." These well-meaning people were unaware of or in-
different to the age-long struggle against arbitrary power and
they failed to realize that the immunity of the citizen from the
unlimited caprice of the executive has been the greatest single
victory of the masses of men in their march toward free gov-
ernment. It can be laid down as an axiom of political science
that any individual, who in his political thinking has completely
discarded the very conception of usurpation and who holds that
what is, is legal, will be found in times of stress in the tyrant's
camp.
To even the novice in constitutional law, these questions
would occur. Does the president, as commander-in-chief, have
the power to declare the whole country under martial law?
Does he have the same power over civilians as over persons of
military status? Is there no distinction between the public
enemy and the civilian in domestic territory accused of being
an enemy sympathizer? Does the commander-in-chief have
exactly the same power in invaded hostile territory as in ter-
ritory outside the theater of war? Is there no difference be-
tween martial law, military law and military government? Can
the commander-in-chief exercise complete legislative and judi-
cial power in war time?
What is the nature and extent of this power758 First, it
should be noted that there are no express limitations on the
president's power as commander-in-chief of the army and navy.
But it should be remembered that altho the framers of the Con-
stitution gave the president this apparently unlimited power,
they gave him no army or navy to command. For that he must
come to Congress.5 9
1' For general discussion see Berdahl: "War Powers of the Execu-
tive of the United States." Univ. of Ills., 1920, Chap. 7: "Powers of
Command," pp. 115-137.
"Art. 1, Sec. 8, clauses 12 and 13.
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Second, with reference to the militia of the several states,
the Constitution expressly limits the president's command in
several respects. (a) He has command of the militia only
"when called into the actual service of the United States."
6 0
Judge Story says, "The right of governing them (the militia)
was confined to the single case of their being in the actual serv-
ice of the United States. . . . It was then and then only that
they could be subjected by the general governmen't to martial
law. "61 In McCall's case 32 a United States District court de-
clared that "whether a man is lawfully in military service must
always be a judicial question. It is peculiarly a question for
decision under habeas corpus." (b) The president cannot upon
his own authority, order the militia into "the actual service of
the United States." That power is expressly given to Con-
gress.6 3 (c) Moreover, when the militia is in "the actual service
of the United States, the president is limited in the purposes for
which he may use the said militia." Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 15, pro-
vides that Congress can call forth the militia for three purposes,
"to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections and
to repel invasions." (d) Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 16, provides that
the appointment of militia officers shall be reserved to the states.
This is another limitation on the president's power as com-
mander-in-chief. "The Constitution is not clear as to what
authority may appoint the commanding officers when several
different militia units, or militia from several different states
are called into the service of the United States.''6" 4
Third, it follows as a corollary from what has been said,
that he is not commander-in-chief of the citizens of the United
States, but only of the army and navy and of the militia when
called into the actual service of the United States.
Fourth, no president has ever assumed actual personal
command of the army in the field. To do so would prevent him
from carrying out other functions imposed by the Constitution.
The authorities are not in agreement as to whether the Con-
Art. 2. Sec. 2, clause 1.
Commentaries on the Constitution, Sec. 1202.
15 Fed. Cases, 1125-1231.
OsArt. 1, Sec. 8, clause 15.
Berahl Ibid., p. 135.
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stitution, by implication, confers this power.0 5 We are inclined
to believe that he does have this power. The office of comman-
der-in-chief is not inconsistent with but complimentary to that
of the office of chief executive. We are in complete agreement
with Senator Bacon when he said, "I want to give my idea as
to why the Constitution vests in the president the office of com-
mander-in-chief. The president is an executive. Upon him de-
volves the execution of the law and the enforcement of the law;
and the enforcement of the law must necessarily be, in its last
analysis, thru the military arm. Of course the president cannot
be the supreme executive unless he has the supreme command
of that thru which the execution of the law must be enforced.' 6 6
It should be in the discretion of the president whether or not he
should assume personal command.
Fifth, congress itself cannot direct the conduct of campafgna
It cannot delegate that power to any person or persons. It can
legislate relative to the size of the army and navy, the compensa-
tion of officers and men, the term of service as well as on many
other matters, but the command of the army and navy, and with
that the plan of campaign, is vested in the president.
The distinction must neit be made between military law, mU.
itary government and martial law. Military law is for the gov-
ernment of the army and navy and of the militia when called
into the actual service of the United States. It has no applica-
tion whatever to the civilian.
Military government has been defined as "that dominion
exercised in war .by a belligerent power over territory invaded
and occupied by him and over the inhabitants thereof.67 Mili-
tary government has to do with the externaw aspect of the war
power. It is a government imposed upon the public enemy and
the president's power in this matter is not limited by the Consti-
tution, but by the laws and usages of war.68 It exists "simply
as a consequence of conquest and occupation. "09
"See McLain, Const. Law, 210; Finley and Sanderson: "The Amer-
Ican Executive and Executive Methods," 267; Watson on the Const. ,
919; Miller on the Constitution, 163; Von Holst, Const. Law of the U.
S., 197.
Cong. Record XLIII, pt. 3-60, Cong. 2 Sess., 2542-2543.
Winthrop, Abridgment of Military Law, 322.
"Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158, 170; Dooley v. United States, 18?
U. S. 222, 230-231.
*Winthrop ibid., 322-323.
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The term martial law has been used in two senses; one to
describe a foreign or international fact, the other describing a
domestic or municipal fact.70  Martial law as exercised by the
cbm~nander of a foreign army when he invades another country
is an element of the jus belti. It is incidental to the state of war
and appertains to the law of nations. With this we are not here
concerned. We are interested in the internal aspect of the war
power, and as such we intend to deal with the martial law in our
own country as administered by our military commanders.
When the term is used in this sense "it is but a form of police
power of the state. in its origin, its operation and its conse-
quences, it is but the utilization of the military forces by the
civil authorities. Civil rights are not destroyed, new offences
are not created, military government is not established by a proc-
lAmation of martial law. "71
The leading case on this point is ez parte Milligan.7 2 The
real question before the court was whether President Lincoln's
proclamation authorizing military trial of civilians was constitu-
tional. The court unanimously decided that the president could
not establish a military commission to try capital crimes where
the civil courts were open. The majority of the courts went
further and decided what was not before them: i. e., that not
even congress could do this; and from this obiter there were
four dissents. This case emphasizes three limitations on the
scope of martial law; the territorial limitation, the time limita-
'tion, and the legal effect of denying the writ of habeas corpus.
The court said as to the first, "Martial law can never exist where
the courts are open, and in the proper unobstructed exercise of
their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual
war." As to the second, "as necessity creates the rule, so it
limits its duration, for, if this government (military commission)
is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpa-
tion of power." As to the third, "The Constitution goes no
further. It does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied
a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of
10 See Att. Gen. Caleb Cushing's opinion to See. of State Marcy, 8
Op. Att. Gen. 365.
"
1Willoughby, The Const. Law of the United States, Vol. II, pp.
1229 ff; Kimball, The Government of hte United States, pp. 440-441.
4 Wall. 2.
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the common law. If it had intended this result it was easy by
the use of direct words to have accomplished it. The illustrious
men who framed that instrument were guarding the foundations
of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power.
But it is insisted that the safety of the country in time of war
demands that this broad claim for martial law shall be sustained.
If this were true, it would be well said that a country, preserved
at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not
worth the cost of preservation. . . . Civil liberty and this kind
of material law cannot endure together; the antagonism is irre-
concilable and in the conflict, one or the other must perish."
This case stands out as a landmark in the great struggle
against arbitrary government. It constitutes the most forcible
protest that has been made against that policy which would sub-
ject the civilian, residing remote from armies and the actual
theater of war, in a neighborhood where all the laws of the land
may be enforced by constitutional means, to the arrogance of a
military commission operating under a capricious procedure and
prescribing penalties for offenses unknown to Anglo-Saxon juris-
prudence. That decision will be appealed to as long as men be-
lieve in the primary principle of free government, that the mili-
tary shall be subservient to the civil power.
Not only does our constitutional law safeguard the personal
liberty of the civilian from arbitrary action by the military
authorities, but it also extends its protection about his property.
Mitelbell, v. Harmony73 is another great case, altho not so well
known as ex Parte Milligaum. The decision delivered by Chief
Justice Taney holds that "a military officer cannot take posses-
sion of private property for the purpose of insuring the success
of a distant expedition upon which he is about to march. The
officer who makes the seizure cannot justify his trespass by show-
ing the orders of his superior officer. Private property may be
taken by a military commander to prevent it from falling into
the hands of the enemy or for the purpose of converting it to the
use of the public; but the danger must be immediate and im-
pending, or the necessity urgent for the public service, such as
will not admit of delay, and where the action of the civil author-
1113 Howard 115.
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ity would be too late in providing the means which the occasion
calls for."
We introduce one further judicial utterance on the limits
of martial law. "That the president, can of his own accord
assume distatorial power, under any pretext, is an extravagant
assumption. The proposition cannot be entertained by any
court; no such inquiry can arise under the Constitution of the
United States; it does not reach to the proportions or stature
of a question. . . . Neither can even the commander-in-chief
of the army extend martial law beyond the sphere of military
operations ....... Within the immediate theater' of insur-
rection or war, the commander-in-chief and his subordinates,
where the exigency of the occasion makes it necessary, we repeat,
do possess it; beyond it the ordinary course of proceeding in
courts of justice will be sufficient to punish any persons who
furnish information or afford any aid or comfort to the enemy,
or in any way' are guilty of the detestable crimd of betraying
their country. "74
In addition to these limitations on the scope of martial
law, it should be remembered that the military power of the
president is derived from the Constitution of the United States.
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The idea of executive prerogative has no place in American con-
stitutional theory. The states would never have adopted the
Constitution if they had supposed that in time of war the reins
of government would be in the hands of a dictator. In the case
of United States v. Lee78 the court ordered to be restored to the
son of Robert E. Lee the estate of Arlington taken from his wife
during the war under an irregular tax sale and at the time of
the suit in the hands of the military authorities. Justice Mller
said, "No man in this country is so high that he is above the
law. Shall it be said . . . that the courts cannot give a
remedy when a citizen has been deprived of ,his property by
force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the govern-
ment without lawful authority, without any process of law and
without compensation, because the president Ias ordered it and
his officers are in possession?" The fact that there is no express
",Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. 563 (1863).
'Art. 2, Sec. 2, clause 1.
TO106 U. S. 196, 220.
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limitation in the clauses conferring on the president the power
of commander-in-chief, does not mean that that power is absolute.
Those who argue that the president has an implied constitutional
right as commander-in-chief in time of war, to disregard any one
positive prohibition of the -Constitution, or to exercise any one
power not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
because in his judgment he may thereby best subdue the enemy,
must admit that he has the same right, for the same reason to
disregard eack and every provision of the Constitution and to
exercise all power needful in his opinion to enable him to win
the war.
We have seen that to be an advocate of unlimited power
in war time, it is not necessary to belong to that class that rudely
asserts that the Constitution has been temporarily interred.
Many prefer to reach the same result by a resort to ingenious and
bizarre interpretations. A favorite argument, much used by
advocates of unlimited power, has been well expressed by Con-
gressman Welty. He says, "When the life of a country is at
stake, we cannot question the constitutionality of an act if that
act will preserve the Constitution.' ' " But who is to determine
whether the life of the country is at stake and who is to decide
that the act wl preserve the Constitution? Shall the Legisla-
tive, the Executive or the Judiciary determine when and on
what occasion this dormant power of self preservation shall be
called into active exertion. And if the decision involves dis-
cretion, who shall revise and correct that discretion?
It is our belief that all of these extra constitutional theories
are fraught with danger. The "'war power," when properly
viewed, is a constitutional power. It is not a power outside or
above the Constitution. It is within the Constitution. True, war
powers are greater than other powers because war is the supreme
effort of a nation. We believe in the doctrine of the Supreme
Court of the United States as expounded in the case of Ex Parte
Milligan. 78  "The government, within the Constitution has all
the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its
existence."
" Cong. Record, Vol. 55, pt. 4, p. 3939, June 20 1917.
"4 Wall. 118.
KENTUcKY LAw JOuRNA4.
The advocates of all the extra-constitutional and necessita-
rian theories of construction, however great their divergence in
their patricular method of approach, have this similiarity in
fact; they. are equally uncritical in their attitude. They see
no inherent difference between the person of military status and
the civilian. They recognize no distinction between the power
of a commander invading hostile territory and his power in do-
mestic territory, far from the actual theater of war. They would
place the public enemy and the civilian, accused of being an
enemy sympathizer, in exactly the-same category. They would
introduce into American constitutional law the continental con-
ception of the "state of seige," in which constitutional guar-
antees are suspended. They w'ould attempt to widen the scope
of martial law so as to include communities far distant from the
clash of arms, for they insist that in modern war "there is
scarcely any limit on the earth, in the air, or in the waters which
it is possible to put upon the exercise of acts of hostility."7 9
The advocates of unlimited power have failed to glean from
the pages of history that the strict subordination of the military
to the civil power is at the foundation of freedom and that the
first object of a free people is the preservation, of their liberty
and that under a constitutional system such as ours, liberty can
be preserved, not by a blind reliance on the benevolence of rulers,
but by effectively maintaining constitutional restraints.
FOREST R. BLAcx
University of Kentucky,
College of Law.
"The quoted portion is from an English case, Rex v. Superintend-
ent Vine Street Police Station, 32 Times L. R. 3 (1915). The Defense
of the Realm Act of 1914, known as D. 0. R. A., virtually introduced for
the first time into England the doctrine of the "state of siege." Advo-
cates of unlimited power in the United States quote this case with
favor. See Henry . Fletcher's articles in 2 Minn. Law Review, 110::
"The Civilian and the War Power."
